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IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE B. PECK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
|

CASE NO. 20057

DONALD J. PECK,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in

awarding a substantial portion of the remaining marital
property to the wife where the parties had dissimilar
earning power, where the wife had contributed to the
acquisition of marital assets by way of inheritance funds,
and where the husband had exclusive control of the family
corporation which had historically produced significant
income, and continued so to do, until said husband ceased
all record keeping, failed to maintain corporate assets
in his custody, and depleted the assets of said corporation
prior to trial.
2.

The Trial Court did not commit reversible error

by not making a specific finding as to the husband's earning
capacity where the court was unable to do so because of
the husband's failure to make a full disclosure of either
the assets or the income of the family corporation which
he exclusively controlled.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent (wife) filed her Verified
Complaint for divorce on the 6th day of January, 1984,
in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Carbon
County, State of Utah (R. 1-4).

ShoreLy thereafter, the

wife's Order to Show Cause requesting the exclusive use
of the home of the parties, the contents located therein,
temporary alimony and attorney's fees was personally served
on the Defendant-Appellant (husband) in the State of Nevada
on January 27, 1984, thereby ordering his appearance before
said Court on the 21st day of February, 1984

(R. 8-9).

The husband elected not to appear for the hearing but was
represented by Attorney Michael Harrison and, after hearing
sworn testimony, the Court entered an Order granting the
wife temporary alimony in the sum of $1,500.00 per month
together with the other relief prayed for in her Order
to Show Cause (R. 10-11).

Following the hearing, the

husband's attorney of record withdrew from the case and
present counsel entered an appearance (R. 18-20).
Husband's counsel petitioned for rehearing on the
Temporary Order with respect to the issue of alimony and
further sought to have the exclusive control of the family
corporation, Diana, Inc., awarded to him during the pendency
of the action (R. 22-25).

On March 19, 1984, the hearing

date on the husband's Petition, the parties entered into
an Oral Stipulation in open court whereby the wife consented
to the husband's exclusive control of Diana, Inc. and further
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consented to reserve the issue of temporary support until
the time of trial (R. 36-37).
The matter came on regularly for trial before the
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Judge, on April 19, 1984.
The Trial Court granted a divorce to the wife and awarded
her the home and its contents, her vehicle and two parcels
of property in which the parties had an interest.

The

court awarded the husband the family corporation and all
of the assets thereof, his vehicle, and all of the personal
property in his possession including his new mobile home
and the furnishings located there (R. 82-85, 89-91).
The court granted the wife alimony as well as a
judgment for

a portion of the temporary support covered

by the wife's Order to Show Cause.

Such alimony awards

are not challenged by this Appeal.
The Trial Court entered its Findings, Conclusions
and Decree on the 15th day of June, 1985, copies of which
are attached hereto as Appendix "A", and the husband
thereafter perfected this Appeal on the issue of the
property division only.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on the 16th day of September,
1950.

During the almost 34 years of marriage, five children

were born as the issue of the marriage, four of whom are
surviving, and all of whom have obtained their legal age
of majority and are self-supporting.
The parties separated on the 6th day of November,
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1983, after the husband confessed to an extra-marital
affair and related activities and asked for a divorce (TR.
16-24).
In mid-November of 1983, the parties had a conversation
concerning the commencement of a divorce proceeding and
during that conversation the husband threatened the wife
that he would break up the family corporation, pull off
the project under construction and allow the corporate
bonding company, which held all of the family's personal
and real property as collateral, to take everything if
the wife did not go along with the husband's proposed
distribution (TR. 80-81, 83-84).
Subsequent to the husband's threat, the wife became
aware, through various sources, that the husband was not
answering company mail, providing blue slips for employees,
or dealing with any of the general business obligations
of the family corporation known as Diana, Inc.(TR. 6366).

The wife attempted to answer the business correspondence,

filed annual corporate returns in order to restore the
corporation to good standing, corresponded with creditors
and raised funds to meet corporate obligations in an attempt
to preserve the marital assets (TR. 47-49, 63-66, 88-89);
however, the husband closed all of the corporate bank
accounts in early December of 1983, and took complete
control of the family corporate funds after that date (TR.
88-89, 129-130).

From that point on, the husband ceased

all record keeping on the income of the corporation, ran
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the business without bank accounts (TR. 130-131), produced
no records for the corporate accountant (TR. 137-139);
and did not pay the obligations of said corporation (TR.
161-165).
During the marriage, the parties acquired a home
and adjacent real property upon which a small greenhouse
business known as Peck's Plants is located; a 58% partnership
interest in the Swasey property and the installment land
contract resulting from a partial sale thereof; Miller
Creek property; various vehicles; a furnished mobile home;
various household furnishings; and the wholly owned family
corporation known as Diana, Inc.
At trial, the wife presented Exhibit 8, Plaintiff's
Marital Asset Schedule, which was based upon the appraisal
of James Bartorelli, a real estate appraiser with seven
years experience in the Carbon County area; his appraisal
was introduced as plaintiff's Exhibit 7 (TR. 3, 6 ) . The
husband also offered an Exhibit of Marital Assets, Exhibit
17.

When cross-examined about the methods by which the

husband had obtained the market values designated thereon,
he admitted he had no comparable sales for any of the
properties (TR. 153-154) , he had no bona fide offers for
purchase with respect to any of the properties (TR. 153),
he was uncertain as to the outstanding obligations on any
of the properties (TR. 152), he had been gone from the
Carbon County area much of the time during the past four
years (TR. 153), and he got his market values "from
5

the ones they sell on T.V."

(TR. 154).

The home of the parties is located on the Old Spring
Glen road in Carbon County and is more particularly described
as parcel #1 of the Bartorelli appraisal (Exhibit 7 ) .
James Bartorelli valued the home, the greenhouse sheds
and the land, including a 50 foot strip purchased from
Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, neighbors, at a total market value
of $68,588.00.

The home and property are subject to an

outstanding indebtedness in the sum of approximately
$26,000.00, resulting in an equity of $42,588.00.
The wife testified that when the State of Utah was
doing a highway project several years ago, a portion of
the parties1 property was affected.

During the late I970 f s,

the State of Utah had indicated a willingness to deed to
the parties a strip of land consisting of slightly less
than one acre, as compensation to the parties for the
impact of the state project on their property (TR. 2627).

The wife testified that subsequent to that understanding,

and upon performance of a title search on the property,
the

State of Utah concluded that it did not own the

property, as it was subject to claim by the Denver and
Rio Grande Railroad (TR. 103). Both parties agreed as
of the date of trial that the State of Utah had not conveyed
to the parties, or either of them, said strip of property.
The wife testified that as of the day prior to trial, after
having reviewed the records of the Carbon County Recorder's
Office, the property still appeared in the name of the
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State of Utah subject to the Denver and Rio Grande rightof-way and that said property was a mere expectancy but
that in the event the property ever was conveyed, it should
be made part of the legal description of the home property
as it is adjacent thereto (TR. 26-27, 103).
The parties accumulated the Swasey property adjacent
to Highway 50 in late 19 77.

The wife sought financial

backing for the purchase and contacted her personal friend,
Garn Anderson, who agreed to enter a partnership for the
purchase of the property (TR. 36). The partnership purchas
56.63 acres of raw, undeveloped ground located in Carbon
County (TR. 37-38) for the sum of $70,000.00 (Exhibit 8 ) .
The property is more particularly described as parcel #2
of the Bartorelli appraisal (Exhibit 7 ) . The partnership
subsequently

sold twenty acres of ground to Mike Dmitrich

in December of 1982, for the sum of $80,000.00 on a Uniform
Real Estate Contract (TR. 37-39).

The wife testified that

Mr. Dmitrich selected the best twenty acres of ground for
his purchase and that the balance of the property owned
by the partnership was primarily hillside (TR. 38-39).
The wife testified that $17,400.00 received by the parties
as their portion of the Dmitrich down payment was loaned
to Diana, Inc. (TR. 36). James Bartorelli testified that
the entire Swasey property, including the Dmitrich portion,
had a fair market value of $42,200.00 as of the time of
trial (Exhibit 7 ) . He testified to a severe decline in
the property values in Carbon County during the last three
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years due to a depressed economic demand for coal (TR.
12).

He further testified to the rampant speculation in

property which occurred between 1975 and 1982 in Carbon
County along highways or in the vacinity of proposed
construction sites (TR. 9-10, 13-14).

He testified that

the Swasey property, being adjacent to a highway, had been
subject to such speculation (TR. 9-10).

Mr. Bartorelli

testified that he appraised all of the acreage in the
Swasey property at the rate of $745.19 per acre and that
the 36.63 acres remaining in the partnership is primarily
hillside and at the rear of the property and should be
reduced further in value if it is not considered adjacent
to the front twenty acre parcel owned by Mike Dmitrich
(TR. 9-10).

The wife additionally testified that the down

payment and the first two annual payments consisting of
a total of $14,000.00 came from the wife's inheritance
from her mother (TR. 39-40)•

The wife further testified

that the remaining proceeds from the Dmitrich contract
are approximately equal to the remaining obligation to
Mr. and Mrs. Swasey (Exhibit 8 ) , as the parties considered
the initial Dmitrich down payment as their equity in the
Swasey property.
The parties additionally accumulated a 17 acre parcel
of property in Miller Creek, Carbon County, Utah from Mr.
and Mrs. Smith (Schmidts).

The property was located

adjacent to a proposed Industrial Park at the time of its
purchase in 1980 (TR. 9, 14-32).
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The wife testified she

convinced Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt to sell the property to
her for the sum of $51,000.00 (TR. 31-32).

At the time

of trial, the parties owed a remaining obligation to the
Schmidts of $36,800.00.

Appraiser James Bartorelli's fair

market value for the Miller Creek property was the sum
of $13,000.00 (Exhibit 7 ) . He testified that the failure
of the proposed Industrial Park had devalued property in
the Miller Creek area dramatically (TR. 9-10, 12-14).

Although

the Miller Creek property was currently a $23,800.00 loss,
the wife asked to be awarded that property as she felt
a personal commitment to Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt for the
obligation on the property (R. 43 Plaintiff's Closing Argument).
The wife additionally operated a small nursery known
as Peck's Plants adjacent to the family home.

She testified

that she currently had geraniums and bedding plants valued
on the retail market at $4,500.00 (TR. 29). She testified
that she generally invested approximately $12,000.00 in
inventory and that she generally earned approximately
$18,000.00 with such an inventory (TR. 109). The husband
agreed with her figures (TR. 118). The wife further testified
that the heavy snows had collapsed the greenhouse buildings
and furnaces (TR. 27-29) and that due to the total lack
of support from the husband she had been unable to open
Peck's Plants and could not do so without capital to restore
the greenhouse structures and inventory (TR. 29). The
Trial Court found that the greenhouse business had been
seriously depleted and that significant capital would be
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necessary before it could become a profitable concern again
(R. 81-82).
The wife additionally owns a 1983 Cadillac which
was an anniversary gift from the husband and which she
financed in her own name when the husband failed to pay
the balance (TR. 44). She valued the car at $14,000.00
subject to an obligation of $9,000.00 existing at the time
of trial (TR. 44). The husband has a 1979 GMC Jimmy
purchased for $13,000.00 (TR. 46) subject tc an obligation
in the name of the parties' son, Danny Peck, which is being
paid by the son.

The husband valued the Jimmy at $3,500.00

(TR. 124). A 1977 International Dump Truck which was used
by Peck's Plants for hauling soil was valued at $2,000.00
to $2,500.00 by the parties (TR. 30-31, 124).
The parties acquired various household goods during
the marriage.

The husband listed various items of furniture

in his Statement of Marital Assets and placed values on
broad general catagories (Exhibit 17). The wife was unfamiliar
with most of the items.

Both parties agreed that the antiques

were inherited by the wife (TR. 155).
The husband purchased a furnished mobile home in
the Spring of 1984 for the sum of $5,600.00 (TR. 158).
He testified that while he is the registered owner of the
mobile home, Diana, Inc. paid $1,000.00 down on the mobile
home and was obligated to pay the remaining balance on
the 120 day note.

The husband did not list the mobile

home as a marital asset or corporate asset (Exhibit 16
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& 17) .
Finally, the parties acquired Diana, Inc., a whollyowned family corporation during the marriage.

The parties

testified that Diana, Inc. was in the business of electrical
contracting and that the husband has primarily operated
the family business, utilizing his years of experience
as an electrical contractor for Utah Power and Light Company
(TR. 120-121).

The estimates of each of the parties concerning

the amount of money which was earned by and deposited into
Diana, Inc. during 1983 varies from between $750,000.00
and $1,000,000.00 (TR. 69-74, 128-129, Exhibit 9 & 10).
Additionally, the husband acknowledged receipt of the sum
of $148,000.00 from the Mount Wheeler Power Company Project
after the date of his closure of the corporation accounts
(TR. 132). He additionally acknowledged $44,000.00 from
the Parowan Project (TR. 147). Additionally, Diana, Inc.
had an $82,000.00 contract in Wells which was not completed.
The wife testified that the husband pulled off the job
(TR. 83-84); the husband denied that but did not explain
the loss of the contract (TR. 146). He had no bank records,
tax returns or accountant's records for any of these additional
funds.
The husband testified that Diana, Inc. had earned
no money and that he had not drawn a salary or been able
to pay debts for quite some time (TR. 133-134).

He testified

that he had not drawn an income from Diana, Inc. since
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September or October of 1983 (TR. 134); howerver, when
presented with his regular payroll checks, signed by him,
up until the date he closed the accounts in December, he
acknowledged that he had received those checks in the sum
of $1/000.00 per month up until the date of the closures
(TR. 134-137/ Exhibit 10). Then he later contradicted
that testimony by introducing a W2 Form prepared by Diana,
Inc., indicating that he earned $3/500.00 fcr all of 1983
(TR. 136-137/ 169-170/ 175). Finally, he submitted a
Financial Declaration claiming no income but personal
expenses for housing, clothing, utilities, food etc.
(Defendant's Financial Declaration).

He then admitted

that Diana, Inc. paid his mobile home payments (TR. 140),
provided his utilities (TR. 141,177), paid all his vehicle
expenses (TR. 140-141) , and provided a clothing allowance
(TR. 144).
The testimony concerning the value of Diana, Inc.
was conflicting.

The wife testified that she did not have

any of the current financial documents for the corporation
due to her lack of involvement since the Temporary Order
and that when she contacted the accountant for current
financial statements, he had no current records from the
husband with which to prepare a financial statement (TR.
78).

The wife introduced a 1981 financial statement showing

assets consisting of $94,000.00 in vehicles and $36,500.00
in equipment (TR. 78 & 172, Exhibit 11). She additionally
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testified that a $7,000.00 wire puller, 1981 GMC pickup,
1980 GMC or Chevy pickup and the Ford line truck were
purchased after the date of that financial statement
(TR.78-79).

Additionally the wife offered Plaintiff's Exhibit

#12, the April 30, 1983 financial statement which outlined
the assets of the corporation (TR. 82-83) .

The husband

presented testimony that Diana, Inc. was in debt for $50,000.00
more than the value of its assets which he valued at a
total of $25,000.00 (TR. 122, Exhibit 17). He based his
testimony on Exhibit 16 & 17, his self-prepared statement
of assets and liabilities exclusively based on his own
opinion

(TR. 121-123).

When asked about specific items

of property reflected in the accountant's prior financial
statements which were not listed in his Exhibit 16, the
husband testified that thousand of dollars of equipment
had been stolen recently (TR. 155-156) or, repossessed
for nonpayment (TR. 75, 161-163,172-174, 183-185).

He

offered no documentation on what items were stolen (TR.
156).

He was unfamiliar with the building listed on his

accountant's previous financial statements (TR. 172) and
did not include it in Exhibit 16; he also felt that the
accountant had used high values for the vehicles (TR. 172)
but was unfamiliar with the method of depreciation used
by the accountants in claiming $80,000.00 worth of depreciation
on the assets (TR. 160, 173, 175).
The wife introduced Diana, Inc. payroll and general
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account checks totalling $49/245.00 made out by the husband
in the months leading up to the divorce for cash or to

Bank

Club, a check cashing club (TR. 137), which were summarized
in Exhibit 19.

The husband testified that he had cashed

those checks but claimed that the money was for payroll
or expenses (TR. 137-138).

He testified that he had no

receipts for any of the money (TR. 139) .

He further testified

that the notations "expenses" or "travel" or "payroll"
were for the accountant because "almost striLCtly once I
write a check, I can't remember usually what it's for"
(TR. 139). He testified that he had no receipts for any
of the money obtained by cashing the $49, 245.00 worth
of checks (TR. 137-139).

The wife introduced the payroll

and general account records of Diana, Inc. thru December,
1983, which showed the payroll, travel and expenses of
Diana, Inc. paid directly to the employees and suppliers
by check (Exhibit 9 & 10).
Finally, subsequent to the closure of the accounts,
and in the four months leading up to trial, the husband
ceased payments on many of the corporations obligations
claiming insufficient funds (TR. 161). One line truck
in the husband's control was repossessed in April for four
passed due payments covering December of 1983 through March
of 1984

(TR. 162) .

The husband allowed the second line

truck to be taken by the parties' son Dan (TR. 7 5 ) . The
husband testified that the loss of the line trucks have
impeded his ability to work and the income of the corporation
14

(TR. 127). The husband further testified that during December
of 1983 he bought his girlfriend a $1,000.00 ring (TR.
149), that between December of 1983 and the trial date,
he had been shopping for a new car (TR. 149-151); that
he purchased the mobile home and Diana, Inc. paid the $7,000.00
down payment on it shortly before trial (TR. 158) ; and
that Diana, Inc. paid for repair work on his girlfriend's
car (TR. 164).
Both parties agreed that the husband had not provided
any support to the wife since October, 1983.
At the close of testimony, the Court took the matter
under advisement, received written closing arguments from
counsel, and entered its Findings, Conclusions and Decree
on June 15, 1984 awarding the wife the real property in
Carbon County subject to all obligations thereon her car
and the household goods.

The Court awarded the husband

his truck, the mobile home and furniture located therein,
and Diana, Inc. the husband then perfected this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court made an equitable distribution of
the marital estate based on the disparity in the relataive
positions of the parties, the wife's contributions by was
of inheritance and effort in the acquisition of assets, and
the husband's depletion of the assets of the family corporation.

The distribution was based on specific findings

that the husband had not fully disclosed the value of the
corporation or his income, that the corporation had histor-
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ically produced significant income and had the capacity
for future income, and that the wife's nursery business
was not capable of producing an income without substantial
capital.

Appellant should not be allowed to argue that

a lack of specificity in the findings, caused by his own
nondisclosure, constitutes reversible error.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
POINT ONE: THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE CONSIDERING
THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES, THE WIFE'S
CONTRIBUTIONS BY WAY OF INHERITANCE AND THE
HUSBAND'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE OR MAINTAIN THE
VALUE OF THE FAMILY CORPORATION.
Pursuant to Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1958
as amended, the Trial Court may make such Orders concerning
the distribution of the property accumulated by the parties
during its marriage as is equitable.
In determining an equitable division of the marital
property, the court may consider a number of different
factors.

In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d

1066 (Utah 1951) , the Court listed fifteen such factors
which may be considered in apportioning the marital estate:
They include: the respective ages of the
parties; what each may have given up for the
marriage; what money or property each put
into the marriage; the physical and mental
health of the parties; the relative ability,
training and education of the parties; the
duration of the marriage; the present
income of the parties; the efforts exerted
by the parties in acquiring marital property;
the present mental and physical age of the
parties; the ability of the wife to provide,

16

income for herself; and the ability of the
husband to provide support.
Additionally, the determination of the relative value
of assets contained in the marital estate is a matter for
the Trial Court which will not be reviewed in the absence
of a clear abuse of discretion.

Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d

6, (Utah 1982); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah
1980); McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1979).
The Trial Court division of the marital property will
not be disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice
or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.
Turner v. Turner, Supra; Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah
1980); Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977).
Where the above stated standards are applied to the
case at bar, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding the wife the home and real property located
in Carbon County and the husband the family corporation
and his mobile home.
First, although appellant contends that the parties
are equal (Appellant Brief P.9), the testimony demonstrated
a disparity between the relative positions of the parties.
The husband is an electrical contractor with years of
experience who successfully operated his own business right
up to the commencement of the divorce proceedings.

The

family corporation he operated had been the primary source
of support for the parties and their children for a number
of years; and, the Trial Court found that the corporation
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was still providing an income to the husband at the time
of trial (R. 81). On the other hand, the wiEe had been
primarily a housewife who operated a small nursery adjacent
to the home of the parties.

That business was not operable

at the time of trial since the greenhouse enclosures had
been collapsed by snow, the furnace had been damaged and
the wife had not been able to purchase the $10,000.00 to
$12,000.00 worth of inventory normally required to open
the business for the season.

It was undisputed that the

wife had received no support from the husband since October
of 1983, six months

prior to trial.

The Trial Court found

that the nursery business could not be a profitable concern
without significant capitol (R. 81-82); therefore, the
relative earning capacity of the parties is markedly
different.
Additionally, the efforts of each party in acquiring
marital assets also was disparate.

The wife had inherited

the funds that constituted the entire family investment
in the Swasey property; yet, the profit realized by the
sale of a portion of that property to Mr. Dmitrich was
loaned to Diana, Inc., not returned to the wife.

The

balance of the Dmitrich contract and the obligation on the
remainder of the Swasey property were about equal; therefore,
pursuant to the Decree, tne wife would ultimately end up
with approximately 36 acres of ground, which would be paid
for by the Dmitrich contract in approximately 8 years.
value of that ground at the time of trial, according to
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The

the testimony of the appraiser and considering its terrain
and location was approximately equal to the wife's original
inheritance; yet, the husband claimed $80,000.00 in marital
equity based on his self-prepared statement of value.

It

was undisputed that the wife negotiated the Swasey transaction
and convinced her friendf banker Garn Anderson, into a partnership agreement that enabled the parties to purchase the
Swasey property.
At the time of trial, the Schmidt property was valued
by the appraiser at a net loss of $23,800.00.

He testified

to the economic reasons for the devaluation of the property
since its purchase.

The wife requested that she be awarded

that property as she had arranged the transaction and felt
that she had a personal obligation to the Schmidts.
Given the testimony presented at trial concerning
the acquisition of the above-stated assets, the Trial Court's
distribution in the Decree of Divorce constitutes an equitable
distribution of the marital estate.

The wife was awarded

the home and real property adjacent thereto.

Located on

the property is the nursery business that the wife traditionally
ran and which might be a source of income for the wife in
the future if the capital to repair the structures can be
obtained.

The home and its property has a net equity of

$42,588.00 based upon the testimony of the appraiser.
nursery stock had a value of $4,500.00.

The

Thus, that portion

of the Trial Court's appraisal yielded a total equity to
the wife of $47,088.00 and also gave her a mortgagable asset
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which could be used to seek capital for the nursery.

The

Trial Court also awarded the wife the Swasey property, which
as previously discussed, would return her inheritance of
$14,000.00 plus interest to her in 8 years.

The wife was

also awarded the Schmidt property and its $23,800.00 loss,
her car valued at approximately $5,000.00, and the household
goods, including the antiques which were her inheritance.
It is obvious that the trial court would not accept the
husband's blanket valuation of the household goods which,
according to him, consisted of $25,000.00 in his wife's
inherited antiques and in excess of .55,000.00 worth of
household goods and bronzes.

The wife was unfamiliar with

most of these proported valuables and testified that the
husband picked up what he said he wanted at the time of
the Temporary Order.
Using the appraiser's values for the real property
awarded to the wife and the agreed values for the personal
property, other than the household goods, the Trial Court's
award to the wife is as follows:
1.

Equity in home and its property

+42,588.00

2.

Stock of Peck's Plants and its
truck

+6,500.00

3.

Her car

+5,000.00

4.

Balance of Swasey property after
Dmitrich contract pays indebtedness $14,000.00
Return of Inheritance

5.

Schmidt property

-2 3,800.00

In analyzing the Trial Court's award to the husband,
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several factors are significant: (1) the husband had withdrawn
almost $50,000•00 in cash from the family corporation in
the months preceding the filing of the divorce and that
at least some of those funds were being utilized to buy
gifts for and maintain his girlfriend; (2) that the Financial
Statement for the family corporation showed assets in excess
of $125,000.00 up until the husband ceased all record keeping;
(3) that subsequent to the filing of the complaint but prior
to trial, while the husband had total control of the corporate
assets, he allowed the depletion of major items of property
such as the line trucks at the same time he was spending
money on diamond rings and mobile homes; (4) that the
husband's testimony with respect to his income from the
corporation was throughly impeached by his own financial
declaration, W2 Form and payroll checks; and finally, as
the Trial Court found in its Findings of Fact (R. 81), (5)
there was no way to ascertain the true value of the corporation
at the time of trial nor the husband's income therefrom
because his record keeping, or lack of it, and the alleged
but unsub-stantiated loss of assets had not allowed a full
disclosure.

Considering these factors, the Trial Court

found (R. 81) that the corporation had traditionally provided
support sufficient to provide for the family and the husband
as a viable, functioning ongoing concern.

If viewed in

this light, the husband was awarded the following:
Diana, Inc., a profitable ongoing concern up
to the date of the commencement of the divorce
proceeding.
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The benefit of almost $50,000.00 in cash
withdrawals leading up to the divorce proceedings.
His mobile home and furniture valued at
$5,600.00.
His truck purchased for $13,000.00 and valued
by him at $3,500.00.
All funds received by Diana, Inc. after
December, 1983.
The remaining personal property in his
possession.
Appellant contends that the wife was awarded 9 0% of
the marital estate and cites Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871
(Utah 1979) as authority that such a distribution is tantamount to a clear abuse of discretion that, therefore, the
distribution must have been intended to be punitive in
nature.

The only way that appellant can argue that the

wife was awarded 90% of the marital assets is to base all
figures on the husband's unsubstantiated testimony of value
on every asset including his wife's inheritance, and
completely ignore the experienced appraiser and the
corporate records.

Clearly, the Trial Court did not use

the husband's valuations because they were based solely
on his uninformed opinion and what he saw on T.V.

If the

husband's self-prepared and uncorroborated statement of
assets were to be believed, the household furniture would
be worth more than every other asset the parties own including
the family corporation.
The exact percentage of the award to either party
cannot be determined in this brief any more than it could
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be determined by the Trial Court (R. 81) because a comparison
of the pre-December, 1983 corporate accounts with the husband's
testimony and lack of past-December, 1983 records demonstrates
a lack of disclosure as to the real value of Diana, Inc.,
without being able to place a specific value on the
corporation. The Trial Court made an award that restored
the wife's inheritance,

and gave each party the assets

necessary to provide for their regular employment, living
accomodations and transportation . As such, the Trial Court
achieved an equitable distribution of the marital estate
and did not abuse its discretion in so doing.
POINT TWO
POINT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE WIFE HAD NO PRESENT
EARNING CAPACITY AND THAT THE HUSBAND'S
PRESENT EARNING CAPACITY, AND THE SPECIFIC
VALUE OF HIS CORPORATION WERE UNDETERMINABLE
DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO FULLY DISCLOSE SAME
Respondent is in basic agreement with the standards
of law outlined in Appellant's brief with respect to the
Trial Court's responsibilities to enter and file Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce in
accordance

with the evidence presented at trial.

Respondant,

however, contends that the Trial Court made the only Findings
of Fact available to it in light of the husband's contradictory
testimony and the corporate records.
The Trial Court made a specific finding (R.81) that
neither the true value of Diana, Inc. nor the funds taken
therefrom by the husband could be determined due to the
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lack of full disclosure.

That lack of disclosure was caused

by the husband's lack of record keeping, his closure of
the regular corporate accounts, and his failure to maintain
the regular financial statements which had been routinely
prepared by the corporate accountant.

In short, all

verifiable evidence of the value of Diana, Inc., ended in
December of 1983 when the husband assumed control of all
funds and all assets of the corporation.
The Trial Court entered specific findings of nondisclosure as well as findings that the family corporation
had historically produced significant income, was the only
source of immediate income at the time of trial, and had
the potential for future income (R. 81-85).

Due to the

advantageous position of the Trial Court in evaluating the
relative testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits, this
Court traditionally gives considerable deference to such
findings and judgments.

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430

(Utah 1983) . Additionally, this Court will generally not
disturb the Trial Court's findings if there is substantial
evidence to support them.
208 (Utah 1983).

George v. Peterson, 671 P. 2d

In the case at bar, the Trial Court's

findings and award are supported by the wife's testimony,
the appraiser's valuations, the pre-December, 1983 corporate
records, and the husband's own testimony on cross-examination
with respect to the corporation's payment of his expenses.
Any ambiguity in the findings of the Court as to the value
of Diana, Inc. was

caused by the Appellant's failure to
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disclose, therefore, the property division contained in
the Findings, Conclusions and Decree should be affirmed
as an equitable division of the marital estate.
The Appellant additionally argued that the Trial
Court's failure to make specific findings as to the earning
capacities of the parties constitutes reversible error.
First it should be noted that the Appellant has not appealed
the award of Alimony in the Decree.

He only contends that

the lack of specificity may be prejudicial to him in the
future in the event of a petition for modification of the
Decree.

Such is not the case.

The Court record contains

the financial declarations of each party as of the time
of trial and thereby allows for a re-evaluation of any
substantial change in their circumstances.

Additionally,

the Trial Court entered a finding that the family corporation
was the sole source of income at the time of trial as the
greenhouse business was not capable of providing an income
(R. 81 & 85). The wife testified she had no income and
no capacity for future income without capital to operate
Peck's Plants and the Court so found (R. 85). The Court
also found that the corporation was providing income for
the husband but the Trial Court was unable to enter an
express amount of income due to the husband's own conflicting
testimony and exhibits.

If the Appellant has been prejudiced

by the Trial Court's findings, he created that prejudice
himself and should not benefit from it.
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court made an equitable distribution of
the marital assets accumulated by the parties during the
marriage based on the evidence and entered the only Findings
of Fact available to the Court with respect to the earning
capacity of the husband and the value of the family corporation as of the date of trial.

The Trial Court's dis-

tribution considered the husband's nondisclosure and nis
depletion of assets and funds from the corporation prior
to trial while he had exclusive control of the corporation,
as well as the historical income background of the corporation.
The Trial Court achieved an equitable balance that allowed
each party housing, transportation and the opportunity for
income.

And that equitable distribution should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this^&7 day of February, 1985.

%j£torneys for Respondent
Suite #4, Oliveto Building
23 South Carbon Avenue
Price, Utah 84501
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct and manually
signed copies of the foregoing were mailed to the following,
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postage prepaid at Price, Utah, on thist^?^ day of February,
1985.
S. Rex Lewis, for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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ATTORNEY AT LAW
23 SOUTH CARBON AVENUE
PRICE, UTAH 84501
PHONE: 8 0 1 / 6 3 7 - 0 1 7 7
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

r.-:wj:A r .ISCJIAM. CLERK
L::."U7f

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE B. PECK,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff;
vs
DONALD J. PECK,
Defendant.

Civil No 14078

This matter came on regularly for trial before the
above entitled Court on the 19th day of April, 1984, the
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and,
the Plaintiff having appeared personally, and with her Counsel,
Joane Pappas White on behalf of Luke G. Pappas; and, the Defendant
having appeared personally and with his Counsel, S. Rex Lewis;
and, the Court having heard sworn testimony and having been fully
advised in the premises now finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident

of Carbon County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three
months immediately next prior to the commencement of this action.
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2.

That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married on the

16th day of September, 1950 at Elkp County, Nevada and have
been husband and wife since that time.
3.

That there have been five children born as the issue

of this marriage, four of whom are still living and all of whom
have attained their legal age of majority and are self-supporting.
4.

That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff cruelly

causing her great mental stress and suffering.
5.

That the parties hereto have accumulated substantial

real and personal property during this thirty-four year marriage.
That the Court is having difficulty in properly trying to
distribute those assets because they are not liquid and nearly
all of them are subject to debt that require monthly or annual
payment in substantial amounts and the evidence does not disclose
a viable source from which such payments can readily be made.
The matter is further complicated in that the Court feels that
the true value of Diana Corporation has not been fully disclosed
nor has the income been taken from that company by the Defendant.
It appears obvious that the Defendant is living off the income
from the company but the evidence is lacking as to the extent
of such draws or the availability of funds from which to order
any direct payments or alimony payments. The only source of income
to the parties at the time of the divorce hearing was the
corporation which, over the years, has been the primary source
of income along with the greenhouse business that has been depleted
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to the point where more capital is going to have to be expended
to make it a profitable concern.

Taking in to consideration the

exhibits introduced at trial and the difficulties outlined herein,
the Court hereby finds that the real and personal property
accumulated by the parties is awarded as follows:
A.

To the Plaintiff:
1.

The home of the parties located at the

Junction of Highway #6 and the old Spring Glen Road together
with all the real property surrounding said home, including any
possible acquisition from the Utah State Road Department, subject
to the debt and mortgage owed on said property which the Plaintiff
is ordered to assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless
therefrom.

Said property located in Carbon County, State of

Utah, is more particularly described as follows:
PARCEL I

Beginning 1758 f t . West of the Southeast
Corner of the Northeast 1/4 Southeast
1/4 of Section 36, Township 13 South
Range 9 East, Salt Lake Base fand Meridian
and running thence North 0°25 East 60
feet; East 308 f t . ; thence Southwesterly
400 feet to i n t e r s e c t i o n of the East
r i g h t of way of highway; thence Northeasterly
along said right of way 190 f e e t to point
of beginning. Also, beginning South 1201.29
feet and West 1421.87 feet of East 1/4
Corner of Section 36; thence South 45°00 f
West 70.71 f e e t ; thence Westf 248 f e e t , more
or l e s s ; thence North
00°34 West 45 f e e t ;
thence North 08°28 , 53 M East 5.05 f e e t ;
thence East 298 f e e t , more or l e s s to point
of beginning.
Including a l l appurtenances and improvements
thereto appertaining.
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2.

All of the household furniture, fixtures,

appliances and like household items now located in the home of
the parties together with any bronze or antique items .
3.

The Swasey property together with all

right, title and interest in the Dimitrich contract, provided
that the Plaintiff assume any debts and obligations owing thereon
and holding the Defendant harmless therefrom.

Said Swasey

property, located in Carbon County, State of Utah, is more
particularly described as follows:
PARCEL II
Section 1, Township 14 South, Range 9
East, SLB&M; SE 1/4 NW 1/4. Also,
beginning 1320 feet South and 2640 feet
West of the Northeast Corner of Section
1; thence South 1320 feet; thence East
520 feet; thence Northeasterly along West
bank of canal to a point 570 feet East
of beginning; thence West 570 feet to
point of beginning. Also, beginning
830 feet South and 1820 feet West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 1;
thence West 820 feet; thence South
500 feet; thence East 570 feet; thence
North 31° East 590 feet; thence North
80 feet to point of beginning.
Containing approximately 56.63 acres
and including all appurtenances and
improvements thereto appertaining.
4.

That Plaintiff is awarded the Miller Creek

property, provided that she assume the outstanding indebtedness
thereon and holds Defendant harmless therefrom.

Said Miller

Creek property located at Carbon County, State of Utah is
more particularly described as follows:
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PARCEL I I I
Beginning at the North 1/16 Corner o f
of S e c t i o n 4 and S e c t i o n 3
Township 15 South, Range 10 East o f
SLB&M; s a i d corner b e i n g marked w i t h
a 1/2 inch pipe in the ground; thence
North, 0°37 f 30" West 50 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t
of beginning; thence South S ^ S ^ S * 1
West 639.42 f e e t ; thence North 0°45 f
West 1234.82 f e e t ; thence North
89°41 , 54" East 642.13 f e e t a l o n g t h e
North l i n e of the S e c t i o n t o t h e NE
corner o f Section 4; thence South
0°37 f 30" West 1232.32 f e e t a l o n g t h e
East l i n e of S e c t i o n 4 t o t h e p o i n t of
beginning.
Containing approximately 17 a c r e s and
i n c l u d i n g a l l improvements and appurtenances
t h e r e t o appertaining.
5.

That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded t h e greenhouse

b u s i n e s s together w i t h a l l of i t s a l l r e l a t e d a c c e s s o r i e s
i n c l u d i n g t h e 19 77 I n t e r n a t i o n a l dump t r u c k .
6.

That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the 1983 Cadilac

automobile provided that she assumes t h e o u t s t a n d i n g
indebtedness thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom.
B.

To the Defendant:
1.

A l l of the r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in that

Corporation known as Diana, Inc. s u b j e c t t o a l l

indebtednesses

owed on any of the equipment or owed by t h e company i t s e l f
to any c r e d i t o r s , and upon which Defendant s h a l l hold P l a i n t i f f
harmless.
2.

The 1979 GMC v e h i c l e s u b j e c t to any

o u t s t a n d i n g indebtedness thereon provided that he holds t h e
P l a i n t i f f harmless therefrom.
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3.

All of the personal items of property

in Defendants possession.
C.

The family annuity insurance policy through

Travelers Insurance s h a l l remain in effect i n i t s current
s t a t e and each of the p a r t i e s s h a l l remain t h e b e n e f i c i a r y
of the o t h e r .
6.

Since the corporation i s the only source of immediate

income and have, based upon i t s p r i o r business record, the
p o t e n t i a l of future income, the Court orders t h a t the
Defendant pay the P l a i n t i f f as and for alimony, the cash
sum of $10,000.00, payable at the r a t e of $2,000.00 per year
with the f i r s t payment due on or before December 31, 1984 and
l i k e payments due on or before December 31 of each and every
year t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l said cash sum has been paid in f u l l .
This amount w i l l a s s i s t the P l a i n t i f f in r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e
greenhouse business so t h a t she can be s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g .
7.

The Court orders t h a t each of the p a r t i e s hereto pay

t h e i r own costs and attorneys f e e s .
8.

The Court previously entered a temporary order r e q u i r i n g

t h e Defendant to pay t o the P l a i n t i f f the sum of $1,500.00 per
month as temporary alimony during the pendency of t h i s a c t i o n .
The Defendant made a Motion to vacate said order on the grounds
t h a t he did not have income in which t o pay t h a t amount.
The Defendant did not personally appear, but appeared through
Counsel at t h e time the Court heard the o r i g i n a l Order To Show
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Cause and the Court denied the Motion to vacate the temporary
order but does alter its order to make it effective for
the period of one month covering the period from the date of the
Order To Show Cause on March 19, 1984, to the trial date
on April 19, 1984. The Decree shall provide that Defendant
shall pay the temporary alimony sum of $1,500.00 due under
the temporary order to the Plaintiff within sixty (60) days
from the date of this Decree.
9.

On the grounds that the parties have been separated

for in excess of six months, the Court finds cause to waive
the three month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow
the Decree of Divorce issued in this case to become absolute
and final upon its entry by the Clerk of the Court in
the Registry of Actions.
10.

That the Plaintiff has sustained the allegations of

her Complaint by adequate evidence.
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of Fact
now concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce

from the Defendant.
2.

That the property and debts accumulated by the parties

during this marriage are awarded pursuant

to paragraph five and

subdivisions thereof of the Findings of Fact.
3.

That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff

the case sum of $10,000.00 for and as alimony, payable at the
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r a t e of $ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 per year with the f i r s t payment due on or
b e f o r e December 31 1 1984 and l i k e payments due on or b e f o r e
December 31 of each and every year t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l s a i d cash
sum has been paid i n f u l l .

This amount w i l l a s s i s t the P l a i n t i f f

in r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e greenhouse b u s i n e s s so t h a t she can be s e l f supporting.
4.

That each p a r t i e s i s ordered to pay h i s or her

r e s p e c t i v e court c o s t s and attorneys f e e s in t h i s matter.
5.

That t h e Defendant i s ordered to pay t o t h e P l a i n t i f f

t h e sum of $ 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 f o r and as temporary alimony due pursuant
t o fche Order To Show Cause and to pay same t o t h e P l a i n t i f f
w i t h i n s i x t y (60) from t h e date of t h e Decree o f Divorce i n
t h i s matter.
6.

For good cause shown, the Court waives the subsequent

t h r e e month i n t e r l o c u t o r y w a i t i n g period so as t o allow the
Decree o f Divorce i s s u e d herein to become a b s o l u t e and f i n a l
upon i t s entry by the Clerk of Court in t h e R e g i s t r y of A c t i o n s .
DATED t h i s / 5 d a y o f June, 1984.
BY ^Mf^SuRT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
S. REX LEWIS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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IN T H E SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN A N D F O R CARBON COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH

CATHERINE B. PECK,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff;
vs
DONALD J. PECK,
Defendant.

Civil No. 14078

This matter came on regularly for trial before the
above entitled Court on the 19th day of April, 1984, the
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, presiding; and,
the Plaintiff having appeared personally, and with her Counsel,
Joane Pappas White on behalf of Luke G. Pappas; and, the Defendant
having appeared personally and with his Counsel, S. Rex Lewis;
and, the Court having heard sworn testimony and having been fully
advised in the premises and having entered the foregoing Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.' That Plaintiff is granted a Divorce from Defendant.
2.

That the property accumulated by the parties during

this marriage is awarded as follows:
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A.

To the Plaintiff:
1.

The home of the parties located at the

Junction of Highway #6 and the old Spring Glen Road together
with all the real property surrounding said home, including any
possible acquisition from the Utah State Road Department, subject
to the debt and mortgage owed on said property which the Plaintiff
is ordered to assume and pay and hold the Defendant harmless
therefrom.

Said property located in Carbon County, State of

Utah, is more particularly described as follows:
PARCEL I

Beginning 1758 f t . West of the Southeast
Corner of the Northeast 1/4 Southeast
1/4 of Section 36, Township 13 South Range
.9 East, S a l t Lake Base and Meridian
and running thence North 0°25 l East 60
feet; East 308 f t . ; thence Southwesterly
400 feet to i n t e r s e c t i o n of the East
r i g h t of way of highway; thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y
along s a i d r i g h t of way 190 feet to point
of beginning. Also, beginning South 1201.29
feet and West 1421.87 feet to East 1/4
Corner of Section 36; thence South 45°00'
West 70.71 f e e t ; thence West
248 f e e t , more
or l e s s ; thence o North 00 o 34' West 45 f e e t ;
thence North 08 28'53" East 5.05 f e e t ;
thence East 298 f e e t , more or l e s s . t o p o i n t
of beginning.
Including a l l appurtenances and improvements
thereto appertaining.
2.

All of the household f u r n i t u r e ,

fixtures,

appliances and l i k e household items now located in the home of
the p a r t i e s together with any bronze or antique i t e m s .

Page Three
3.

The Swasey property together with all

right, title and interest in the Dimitrich contract, provided
that the Plaintiff assume any debts and obligations owing thereon
and holding the Defendant harmless therefrom.

Said Swasey

property, located in Carbon County, State of Utah, is more
particularly described as follows:
PARCEL II
Section 1, Township 14 South, Range 9
East, SLB&M: SE 1/4 NW 1/4. Also,
beginning 1320 feet South and 2640 feet
West of the Northeast Corner of Section
1; thence South 1320 feet; thence 520
feet; thence Northeasterly along west
bank of canal to a point 570 feet Eafct of
point of beginning; thence West 570 feet to
point of beginning. Also, beginning
830 feet South and 1820 feet West of
the Northeast corner of said Section 1;
thence West 820 feet; thence South
500 feet; thence East 570 feet feet; thence
North 31° East 590 feet; thence North
80 feet to point of beginning.
Containing approximately 56.63 acres and
including all appurtenances and improvements
thereto appertaining.
4.

That Plaintiff is awarded the Miller Creek

property, provided that she assume the outstanding indebtedness
thereon and holds Defendant harmless therefrom.

Said Miller

Creek property located at Carbon County, State of Utah is more
particularly described as follows:
PARCEL III
Beginning a t the Northl/16 Corner of
S e c t i o n 4 and S e c t i o n 3
Township 15 South, Range 10 East of
SLB&M; s a i d c o r n e r b e i n g marked with
a 1/2 i n c h pipe in t h e ground; thence
North 0 ° 3 7 , 3 0 u West 50 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t
of b e g i n n i n g ; t h e n c e South 89 0 28'35 M
West 639.42 f e e t ; t h e n c e NoVth 0 ° 4 5 l
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West 1234.82 f e e t ; thence North
Sr'Al'SA" East 642.13 feet along the
North l i n e of t h e Section to the NE
corner of Section 4; thence South
0°37 , 30 n West 1232.32 feet along the
East l i n e of Section 4 to t h e point of
beginning.
Containing approximately 17 acres and
including a l l improvements and appurtenances
t h e r e t o a p p e r t a i n i n g , subject to reservations and
rights-of- way of Record.
5.

That P l a i n t i f f is awarded the greenhouse

business together with a l l of i t s a l l r e l a t e d accessories
including the 19 77 I n t e r n a t i o n a l dump truck.
6.

That P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the 1983 Cadilac

automobile provided t h a t she assume the outstanding
indebtedness thereon and holds the Defendant harmless therefrom.
B.

To the Defendant:
1.

All of the r i g h t , t i t l e and i n t e r e s t in t h a t

Corporation known as Diana, I n c . subject to a l l indebtednesses
owed on any of the equipment or owed by the company i t s e l f
to any c r e d i t o r s , and upon which Defendant s h a l l hold P l a i n t i f f
harmless.
2.

That 1979 GMC vehicle subject to any

outstanding indebtedness thereon provided that he holds the
P l a i n t i f f harmless therefrom.
3.

All of the personal items of property in

Defendants possession.
3.

That the Defendant i s ordered to pay to the P l a i n t i f f

the sum of $10,000.00 as a lump sum cash alimony payment,
payable at the r a t e of $2,000.00 per year with the f i r s t
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p yment due on or before December 31, 1984 and like payments
due on or before December 31 of each and every year thereafter
until said cash sum has been paid in full.

This amount will

assist the Plaintiff in re-establishing the greenhouse business
so that she can be self-supporting.
4.

Each party is hereby ordered to pay his or his

respective court costs and attorneys fees in this matter.
5.

That Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff

the sum of $1,500.00 pursuant to the temporary alimony order
and to pay said amount to the Plaintiff within sixty (60) days
from the date hereof.
6.

For good cause shown, the Court waives the three

month interlocutory waiting period so as to allow this Decree
of Divorce to become absolute and final upon entry by the
Clerk of Court in the Registry of Actions.
7.

The family annuity insurance policy through

Travelers Insurance shall remain in effect in its current
state and each of the parties shall remain the beneficiary
of the other.
DATED this / y d a y of June, 1984.
COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
S. REX LEWIS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decree of Divorce to S. Rex Lewis, of HOWARD, LEWIS,
& PETERSEN, Attorneys for Defendant, 120 East 300 North
Street, P.O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84603 this ^
1984.
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